by By Tayo Oyetibo, SAN
PARTICULARS TO BE SUPPLIED IN PLEADINGS
All facts, which if not pleaded would take the opposite party by surprise ought to be pleaded.47 ▪ SPECIAL DAMAGES: Particulars of a claim for special damages must be supplied – e.g. where the claim is for cost of missing goods, the unit price of each of the goods must be clearly stated.48 See also MOBIL OIL V BARBADOS CARS LTD49
Also in cases of Trademark infringement the onus of proving that the trademark of a defendant is an infringement is on the plaintiff.50 See THE PROCTER AND GAMBLE CO V. GLOBAL SOAP AND DETERGENT INDUSTRIES AND ANOR.51
▪ Particulars of the alleged infringement must therefore be specifically pleaded.
▪ PRE-JUDGMENT INTERESTS: Where interest is claimed as of right, the particulars of the claim for pre-judgment interest, such as the rate of interest and the Claimant’s entitlement to the interest should be pleaded.52 See NPA V AMINU IBRAHIM & CO & ANOR. 53 46Order 13, rule 10 (3) of the Federal High Court Rules (supra) Order 13 Rule 10(3) of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2019 47 OYEBAMIJI V. LAWANSON (2008) 15 NWLR (Pt.1109) 122 48 ABAH V. JABUSCO (NIG) LTD (2008) 3 NWLR (Pt.1075) 526 49 (2016) LPELR – 41603 (CA) 50 Ferodo Ltd v. Ibeto Ind. Ltd (2004) 5 NWLR (Pt. 866) 317 S. C. 51 (2012) LPELR- 8014 (CA) 52 See EKWUNIFE V WAYNE (WEST. AFRICA) LTD (1989) 5 NWLR (PT.122) 422 53 (2018) LPELR – 44464 (SC) 10 of 38
In LADGROUP LTD. V. FBN54, the Court of Appeal per IKEYEGH J.C.A. said: “Because it is settled that pre-judgment interest is not granted as a matter of course or by routine. Accordingly, the appellant was obliged to plead and prove pre-judgment interest by particularisation or specification whether it is a statutory right, or a right arising from custom and practice known to the parties, or that it arose by agreement between the parties before the institution of the case, which was not the case here, so the legs of claim of interest rate not having been made out would have been dismissed…”
▪ Where misrepresentation is alleged, the particulars of the misrepresentation must be supplied.55
▪ FRAUD: Where fraud is alleged, the rule of pleading requires that the particulars be given.56 It has been held that the word “fraud” need not be used.57 It is sufficient if the plaintiff states that the defendant made representations to him (the plaintiff) on which he intended the plaintiff to act, which representations were untrue and known to the defendant to be untrue.58 See also ALIYU V OKOYE & ORS59
▪ In providing particulars, it may be necessary to include date, time and items.60
▪ ILLEGALITY: A Defendant who relies upon the defence of illegality must state the facts on which he relies in his pleading. In ONWUCHEKWA V. NDIC61 , the defendant averred that “the plaintiff negligently caused the delay in processing his documents and illegally paid his suppliers.” The Supreme Court held that the defendant by the above quoted averment could not be said to have pleaded illegality. See UKAH V ONYA62 and HOTEL & CLEARING SERVICES LTD V. UNCLE FURNITURE CO. (NIG) & ANOR63 54 PLC (2017) 12 NWLR (PT 1580) 46 @ 511 – 512 55 See Order 15 Rule 3 of the High Court of Lagos State (Civil Procedure) Rules 2012 56 See Order 15 Rule 3 of the High Court of Lagos State (Civil Procedure) Rule 2012 57Nnamani JSC in OLUFUNMISE V. FALANA (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt.136) 1 @ 16 58 OLUFUNMISE V. FALANA (Supra) 59 (2018) LPELR – 4529 (CA) 60 See Order 15 Rule 3 of the High Court of Lagos State (Civil Procedure) Rules 2012 61 (2002) 5 NWLR (Pt.760) 371 62 (2016) LPELR- 40025 (CA) 63 (2018) LPELR- 45887 (CA) 11 of 38
• Where however a contract is ex-facie illegal, the court will not close its eyes to it whether or not the illegality was pleaded, because it is the duty of every court to refuse to enforce an illegal contract. • SODIPO V. LEMMINKAINEN OY NO.2 64 ▪ DUNALIN INVESTMENTS LTD V. BGL PLC 65
▪ Commission of crime or any other fact showing illegality must be specifically pleaded. In EKWUNIFE V. WAYNE (W/A) LTD66, the Supreme Court held that where a contract is not ex facie illegal and the question of illegality depends on a number of facts, probabilities or possibilities or contingencies to be hammered out by evidence and forensic logic, the general rule is that the illegality must be raised in the pleading. See also HOTEL & CLEARING SERVICES LTD V. UNCLE FURNITURE CO. (NIG) & ANOR67 ▪ Note however that a party relying on “illegality’’ need not use the legal term “illegality” expressly in his pleading. It is sufficient to plead facts from which the Court can come to a decision on whether or not the transaction in question is tainted with illegality.68 ▪ Estoppel as a defence must be pleaded by the party relying on it.69 In BASIRU ALLI v. MR. SAFIU GBADAMOSI & ANOR70 per IYIZOBA J.C.A stated that; “It is the law that, for estoppel to be relied on as a defence, it must be specifically pleaded. However, it is not the law that estoppel must be pleaded in a particular manner. All that is required is that facts must be pleaded which show clearly that the party pleading intends to rely on estoppel as a defence.” 64 (1986) 1 NWLR (PT.15) 220. 65 (2016) 18 NWLR (Pt 1544) 262 @ 317 66 Supra 67 (2018) LPELR- 45887 (CA) PER SANKAY J.C.A 68ALAO V. A.C.B (1998) 3 NWLR (Pt.542) 339 @ 358.
The additional duty on the party seeking to rely on the principle in such a situation is to draw the attention of the Court to the facts. 69 CHUKWUGOR V. A.G. CROSS-RIVER STATE (1998) 1 NWLR (Pt.534) 375 70 (2017) LPELR-42379 (CA) 12 of 38 VICTOR OGBEIDE & ANOR. V. GODWIN OSIFO71 Per ADEREMI J.C.A “It is elementary law that the defense of estoppel must be pleaded by the party relying on it. Egbe v. Adefarasin 1987 1 NWLR (PT. 27) 24.But it is not necessary to plead the defence in any particular manner so long as to show clearly that the party pleading relies upon it as a defense.”
▪ Where estoppel is not pleaded, it is not even open to the court to raise it suo motu. 72 In OLANREWAJU ASAMU v. ISMAILA LAWANSON & ORS73 the Court of Appeal said: “It is the law that a party seeking to rely on estoppel must specifically plead it unless it is so apparently clear that the court has a duty to consider it.”
▪ Adultery in matrimonial cases must be specifically pleaded, giving particulars as to date, time and place of occurrence as well as particulars of the person with whom the adultery was allegedly committed.74 In ORERE v. ORERE75 the Court of Appeal said on this point as follows: “…Adultery as a matrimonial wrong must be specifically pleaded and clearly proved.”
▪ In defamation cases, the words that are alleged to be defamatory must be specifically pleaded as well as the particulars of the publication, and the names of person(s) to whom the words were uttered.76 71 (2007) 3 NWLR (PT 1022) C.A. 72 ADEBISI V. EKWEALOR (1993) 6 NWLR (Pt.302) 643 73 (2014) LPELR-24416 (CA) 74 IKOKU V. OBI (1962) 1 All NLR 194@199-200 75 (2017) LPELR-42160 (CA) Per EKPE, J.C.A. (Pp. 16-17, Paras. C-A) 76 NSIRIM V. NSIRIM (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt.138) 285 13 of 38 In SUN PUBLISHING LTD & ORS v. DUMBA77 the Court of Appeal put the principle thus: “In establishing a claim of defamation, specifically libel which is in a permanent form as in the present case by newspaper, the law requires the plaintiff to plead and reproduce the alleged libelous words/statement(s) in the pleadings, and show proof/evidence of publication of the libelous words/statement(s), in a manner that the plea/defence of justification or privilege cannot avail the defendant…In a libel case, the full text of the publication complained of must be set forth verbatim in the pleadings. This envisages that the full text or the full sentence containing the offensive words must be pleaded.”
• If the defamatory words were written or spoken in a foreign language, the exact words must be pleaded and interpreted into English language.78 See also SYLVERNUS IROEGBU & ORS v. CHIEF ALOYSIUS OKEKE & ANOR79 per IGE, J.C.A.
• In CHIEF T. F. ORUWARI V. MRS. INE OSLER80 the Supreme Court per CHUKWUMA-ENEH, JSC remarked as follows: “It is settled law that the defamatory words in an action in slander as uttered and published in a foreign language as here must be set out side by side the literal translation to English language of the slanderous words for the action to be properly constituted.”
▪ Special defences like qualified privilege or justification must also be pleaded.81 It is to be noted that in pleading “qualified privilege” or “justification”, the defendant need not use those words. So long as the defence of qualified privilege/justification can be inferred from the totality of the facts pleaded.82 77 (2019) LPELR-46935 (CA) (Pp. 12-15, Paras. E-E) 78 OKAFOR V. IKEANYI (1979) 3-4 S.C. 65; EJIKEME V. NWOSU ((2002) 3 NWLR (Pt.754) 356; NINGI V. F.B.N (1996) 3 NWLR (Pt.435) 220 79 (2016) LPELR-40620 (CA) (Pp. 22-23, Paras. A-A) 80 (2013) 5 NWLR (PART 1348) 535 at 549 81 OKAFOR V. IKEANYI (1979) 3&4 SC. 99 82 ESONOWO V. UKPONG (1990) 6 NWLR (Pt.608) 611 14 of 38 • See the case of ALHAJI A.R. SULE & ORS v. MR. J. ORISAJIMI83 where the Supreme Court held as follows: “The law on this issue is long settled. In OFFOBOCHE VS OGOJA (2001) 16 NWLR (Pt.739) 458, this honourable court had this to say: “Where in an action for defamation the defendant raises a defence of privilege, he should as a matter of pleadings aver the facts on which the defence is based… If it is clear on the face of the statement of claim that the occasion was absolutely privileged, it is sufficient to plead that the statement discloses no cause of action. But otherwise the defendant must plead the facts on which he relies as giving rise to the privilege, whether absolute or qualified. In the absence of such plea, the defendant cannot adduce any evidence at the trial to establish such a defence nor cross-examine the plaintiff’s witnesses with a view to a submission that the occasion was privileged. It is not sufficient merely to aver that the defendant pleads the defence of qualified privilege, or to aver that the publication was made on a privileged occasion.” ▪ Waiver should be pleaded if it is intended to be relied on as a defence. As the Supreme Court put it in AUTO IMPORT EXPORT V. ADEBAYO84: “The defence of waiver being a defence available to the defendant, must be clearly raised in the statement of defence. See Caribbean Trading and Fidelity Corporation v. NNPC (1992) 7 NWLR (Pt.252) 161 at 185 para A-B (per Tobi, JCA) as he then was, when he observed thus: “Waiver, being a defence available to a defendant must be clearly raised in the statement of defence. Where it is not raised, then the defendant cannot lead evidence on it. This is borne out from the elementary rule of pleadings that a party is bound by his pleadings. He cannot, as a matter of general principle, raise a matter either in the course of trial or on appeal to embarrass the opponent.”
• However, in FASADE V. BABALOLA85, it was held that a Plaintiff could successfully rely on waiver without having to plead the facts in support thereof, where for example he seeks to rely on the failure of the Defendant to insist on a right to which he is entitled like pre-action notice.
• The court however held that a Defendant who intends to establish waiver in a civil case must first plead the facts relied on for that defence to be able to take advantage of the defence. 83 (2019) LPELR-47039(SC) Per MUHAMMAD J.S.C 84 [2005] 19 NWLR (PT.959)44 PER ONU, J.S.C. (PP.52-53, PARAS.E-A) 85(2003) 11 NWLR (Pt.830) 26 @ 47. See also CARRIBEAN TRADING & FIDELITY CORPORATION V. NNPC (1992) 7 NWLR (Pt.252) 16 15 of 38 This position was confirmed in the case of ROBA INVESTMENT LTD V. AREWA METAL CONTAINERS LTD86 where the court held as follows: “One very important thing that must be present before this doctrine can be successfully raised is that it must be pleaded by a party wishing to rely on same This was the decision of the Supreme Court in Okonkwo V. CCB Nig. PLC (2003) 8 NWLR (pt 822) 347 at 407 – 408 wherein it is stated:- “Waiver as an equitable defence must be specifically pleaded by the defendant.”
▪ Customary law, foreign law as well as Islamic law must be specifically pleaded. The exception to this rule is where a Customary, foreign or Islamic law has been judicially noticed.87 The Court of Appeal reaffirmed this principle of law in EGYPT AIRLINE v. ADAMOU BALLA ABDOULAYE88 where the court remarked follows: “… foreign law and as such is treated as a fact, that must be pleaded. In the case of PEENOK INVESTMENTS LTD. v. HOTEL PRESIDENTIAL (1982) 12 SC (REPRINT) the Supreme Court per A.G. IRIKEFE JSC stated that as a general proposition of law, foreign law is a question of fact which should be pleaded and proved in a trial Court.” Similarly in OKEGBE & ORS v. AKPOME & ORS,89 the Court of Appeal held as follows: “…customary law being a fact must be specifically pleaded and established by evidence before the court. See OLUBODUN V. LAWAL (2008) 35 NSCQLR 574 wherein Aderemi, JSC stated that in relation to adjudication, custom is a question of fact which must be pleaded and proved by independent witness or witnesses. See: also OGOLO V. OGOLO (2003) 18 NWLR (Pt. 852) 494. I am aware of the position of the law that a custom that is of such notoriety and has been frequently followed by the courts can be noticed judicially. See: TORIOLA V. WILLIAMS NSCQR (1982) 890.”
▪ The plea of res ipsa loquitur must be stated by a plaintiff who wants to raise it. He may do this by specifically reciting the maxim, or by alleging in the pleading facts which suggest that the plea is intended to be raised.90 86 (2010) LPELR-4900(CA) Per OKORO, J.C.A (P. 15, paras. A-G) 87 Sections 16(1) and (2) of the Evidence Act 2011 88 (2017) LPELR-43331(CA) Per BDLIYA J.CA 89 (2013) LPELR-21969(CA) Per LOKULO-SODIPE, J.C.A (Pp. 33-34, paras. D-A) 90 ADEBISI V. OKE (1967) NMLR 64 16 of 38
• It is worthy of note that the Court of Appeal in AGIP (NIG) PLC v. UDOM OSSAI91 said: “where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies, that appears to make express pleading of particulars of negligence, unnecessary. See Ibekendu Vs Ike (1993) LPELR-1390 (SC), where it was held: the doctrine need not even be pleaded, so long there are facts pleaded and evidence led before the Court on which it can be based. It can also be pleaded in the alternative to particulars of negligence averred.” But In ROYAL ADE (NIG.) LTD. V. N.O.C.M. CO. PLC92 the Supreme Court held as follows: “…the doctrine need not even be specifically pleaded so long as there are facts pleaded and evidence led before the court on which it can be based. It can also be pleaded in the alternative to particulars of negligence averred as in the present case. In Kuti v. Tugbobo (1967) NMLR 419 at 422 where the Federal Supreme Court so held thus:…..” ‘It will be seen that the plea of res ipsa loquitur is raised in one of two ways; either specifically reciting the Latin Maxim or in the alternative by making it known that the plaintiff intends to rely on the very collusion itself as evidence of negligence,”.
▪ Where pleadings are filed and it is intended to rely on a condition precedent then that condition precedent must be pleaded.93 In BUREAU OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES v. REINSURANCE ACQUISITION GROUP LTD & ORS.94 the Court of Appeal held thus; “Where pleadings are filed and it is intended to rely on a condition precedent then that condition precedent must be pleaded. For, if such condition precedent is not pleaded, the defendant would by the simple rules of pleading be taken to have waived whatever rights he possesses in the subject-matter.” EVIDENCE ACT 2011
▪ Section 84(2) of the Evidence Act 2011 provides that before documents produced by computers can be admissible in evidence, the conditions laid down in the section must be satisfied95 . 91 (2018) LPELR-44712(CA) Per OREDOLA J.CA 92 (2004) 8 NWLR (PT.874)206 PER KUTIGI J.SC 93 MOBIL PRODUCING (NIG) UNLIMITED V. LASEPA & ORS (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt.789) 1 94 (2008) LPELR-8560(CA) Per PETER-ODILI, J.C.A. (Pp.41-42, Paras.F-A) 17 of 38 This position of the law was restated by the Court of Appeal in JUBRIL v. FRN96 as follows: “The provisions of Section 84 which state conditions for admitting in evidence any electronically generated document, are central in determining the admissibility of a document emanating from a computer. The main objective of these provisions is to authenticate and validate the reliability of the computer which generated the evidence sought to be tendered. It was necessary to prove that a computer was operating properly and was not used improperly before any statement in a document produced by the computer could be admitted in evidence. Evidence in relation to the use of the computer must therefore be called to establish compliance with the conditions set out in Section 84(2).”
• It is pertinent to consider the question whether it is necessary to plead facts relating to the conditions laid down in Section 84(2) of the Act regarding the status of the computer by which the document sought to be tendered was produced before evidence is given of those conditions because of the wellknown principle of law that evidence led on facts not pleaded go to no issue97, In HALLMARK CONTRACTORS NIGERIA LTD & ANOR v. GOMWALK 98 the Court of Appeal held as follows: “The foundation or procedure to be laid for tendering a computergenerated or processed statement in evidence is set out in Sections 84(4)-(5) of the Evidence Act (supra) …. Therefore, a party who seeks to tender documentary evidence in Court to prove or disprove a fact in issue has to plead whether such document was processed or generated by “one uniform process, as in the case of printing, lithography, photography, computer or other electronic or mechanical process,” for “each shall be primary evidence of the contents of the rest” of the document.” See Section 84(4) of the Act (supra).” 95 See KUBOR V DICKSON (Supra) 96 (2018) LPELR-43993 (CA) PER SANKEY J.C.A 97 ADEJUMO V. AYANTEGBE(1989) ALL N.L.R 468 98 (2015) LPELR-24462 (CA) per Tur J.C.A @ pp69-71 18 of 38 The same also applies when seeking to tender banker’s books under Section 90(1) (e) of the Act.
▪ It has been held that where an electronic document like a VCD or DVD or other device is to be used in Court by being played, what is necessary is for the party seeking to make use of such device to certify the computers by which the electronic document was produced but it is not necessary to certify the computer gadgets that would be used to play the VCD or DVD or other device in open Court. For this reason it would only be necessary to plead facts relating to the condition of the computers used in producing the electronic document but it will not be necessary to plead the condition of the computer gadgets to be used to play such VCD or DVD in open court: DICKSON v SYLVA99
• In JUBRIL v. FRN (SUPRA) the Court of Appeal further held as follows: “It is now established that the requirement of Section 84(2) and (4) of the said Act can be satisfied by oral evidence of a person familiar with the operation of the computer as to its reliability and functionality. See R v Shephard (1993) AC 380 and Dickson v Sylva (2017) 8 NWLR (Pt 1567) 167, when the Supreme Court held that: “Proof that the computer is reliable can be provided in two ways- either by calling oral evidence or by tendering a written certificate subject to the power of the Judge to require oral evidence”. The evidence of the witness in this regard was all that was needed to satisfy Section 84(2) and (4) of the Evidence Act as the requirement therein is in respect of the computer used in downloading the information.” MUST LIMITATION STATUTE BE SPECIFICALLY PLEADED? ▪ There are conflicting authorities on the question whether a defendant relying on statute of limitation as a bar to an action, should specifically plead that fact. ▪ Limitation of action and issue of Locus Standi are both jurisdictional points which should be capable of being raised without any specific pleading. 99 (2017) 8 NWLR (PT 1567) 167 SC 19 of 38 Thus in AJAYI v. ADEBIYI100 , the Supreme Court held as follows: “Limitation Law and locus standi are both threshold issues which can be raised any time or for the first time in the Court of Appeal or in the Supreme Court. It is not limited to being raised as a special defence and pleading them specifically as required by the Rules of Court…It transcends any High Court rules. It can be raised by preliminary objection at any stage of the proceedings before any court by any of the parties or even suomotu by the court.”
▪ However, in SULGRAVE HOLDINGS INC. v. F.G.N101 , the Supreme Court took a contrary position. At page 339 para G-H, the Court held as follows: “It must be noted that in some jurisdictions of this country the limitation laws are required as per the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules to be pleaded by the defence in order not to take the opposite side by surprise although it may also arise from the facts as pleaded without specifically alleging the relevant limitation law. In that case pleadings have to be filed and exchanged by the parties before an objection to the action being stale and statute-barred can properly be taken.”
▪ But in TIMIPRE SYLVA v. INEC & ORS102 , the Supreme Court held that the plea of statute of limitation which is a jurisdictional issue could be properly raised without prior pleading. The court further held that there is no special format of raising the issue of jurisdiction and that such an issue cannot be defeated by any rule of Court.
▪ Surprisingly, very recently in ABOLURIN v. GOVERNOR OF KWARA STATE & ORS103 the court of appeal apparently in ignorance of the decision in SYLVA v. INEC (supra) still held that a party wishing to rely on a statute of limitation must specifically plead same.
▪ In an action brought by originating summons, the Defendant can raise the defence in his counter-affidavit.104 100 (2012) 11 NWLR (PART 1310) 137 @ 172-173 101 (2012) 17 NWLR (PART 1329) 309 @ 339 102 (2015) ALL FWLR (PT 810) : (2015) LPELR 24447 (SC) 103 (2018) LPELR-43976(CA) 104 P.A.S & T.A. LTD V. BABATUNDE (2008) 8 NWLR (Pt.1089) 267 20 of 38 In the case of THE HONOURABLE FEMI GBAJABIAMILA v. THE CENTRAL BANK OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA & ORS105 the Court of Appeal held thus; ”Affidavits in originating summons are considered to be pleadings. The claimant’s affidavit is taken as the statement of claim. While the defendant’s counter affidavit is taken as statement of defence… In the case on N.N.P.C. and Ors. v. Famfa Oil Ltd. (2012) 17 NWLR (pt.1328) 148 at 189 it was stated in the lead judgment by RhodesVivour, J.S.C., inter alia that – “When an originating process (as in this case) is an originating summons, the affidavits filed in support serve as the statement of claim, while the counter affidavits serve as statement of defence. The affidavits are the pleadings for the case.” (My emphasis). See also Uwazuruonye v. Governor of Imo State and Ors. (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt.1355) 28 at 56.”
[To be continued]
Footnotes
49 (2016) LPELR – 41603 (CA) 50 Ferodo Ltd v. Ibeto Ind. Ltd (2004) 5 NWLR (Pt. 866) 317 S. C. 51 (2012) LPELR- 8014 (CA) 52 See EKWUNIFE V WAYNE (WEST. AFRICA) LTD (1989) 5 NWLR (PT.122) 422 53 (2018) LPELR – 44464 (SC)
54 PLC (2017) 12 NWLR (PT 1580) 46 @ 511 – 512 55 See Order 15 Rule 3 of the High Court of Lagos State (Civil Procedure) Rules 2012 56 See Order 15 Rule 3 of the High Court of Lagos State (Civil Procedure) Rule 2012 57 Nnamani JSC in OLUFUNMISE V. FALANA (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt.136) 1 @ 16 58 OLUFUNMISE V. FALANA (Supra) 59 (2018) LPELR – 4529 (CA) 60 See Order 15 Rule 3 of the High Court of Lagos State (Civil Procedure) Rules 2012 61 (2002) 5 NWLR (Pt.760) 371 62 (2016) LPELR- 40025 (CA) 63 (2018) LPELR- 45887 (CA)
64 (1986) 1 NWLR (PT.15) 220. 65 (2016) 18 NWLR (Pt 1544) 262 @ 317 66 Supra 67 (2018) LPELR- 45887 (CA) PER SANKAY J.C.A 68ALAO V. A.C.B (1998) 3 NWLR (Pt.542) 339 @ 358. The additional duty on the party seeking to rely on the principle in such a situation is to draw the attention of the Court to the facts. 69 CHUKWUGOR V. A.G. CROSS-RIVER STATE (1998) 1 NWLR (Pt.534) 375 70 (2017) LPELR-42379 (CA)
71 (2007) 3 NWLR (PT 1022) C.A. 72 ADEBISI V. EKWEALOR (1993) 6 NWLR (Pt.302) 643 73 (2014) LPELR-24416 (CA) 74 IKOKU V. OBI (1962) 1 All NLR 194@199-200 75 (2017) LPELR-42160 (CA) Per EKPE, J.C.A. (Pp. 16-17, Paras. C-A) 76 NSIRIM V. NSIRIM (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt.138) 285
77 (2019) LPELR-46935 (CA) (Pp. 12-15, Paras. E-E) 78 OKAFOR V. IKEANYI (1979) 3-4 S.C. 65; EJIKEME V. NWOSU ((2002) 3 NWLR (Pt.754) 356; NINGI V. F.B.N (1996) 3 NWLR (Pt.435) 220 79 (2016) LPELR-40620 (CA) (Pp. 22-23, Paras. A-A) 80 (2013) 5 NWLR (PART 1348) 535 at 549 81 OKAFOR V. IKEANYI (1979) 3&4 SC. 99 82 ESONOWO V. UKPONG (1990) 6 NWLR (Pt.608) 611
83 (2019) LPELR-47039(SC) Per MUHAMMAD J.S.C 84 [2005] 19 NWLR (PT.959)44 PER ONU, J.S.C. (PP.52-53, PARAS.E-A) 85 (2003) 11 NWLR (Pt.830) 26 @ 47. See also CARRIBEAN TRADING & FIDELITY CORPORATION V. NNPC (1992) 7 NWLR (Pt.252) 16
86 (2010) LPELR-4900(CA) Per OKORO, J.C.A (P. 15, paras. A-G) 87 Sections 16(1) and (2) of the Evidence Act 2011 88 (2017) LPELR-43331(CA) Per BDLIYA J.CA 89 (2013) LPELR-21969(CA) Per LOKULO-SODIPE, J.C.A (Pp. 33-34, paras. D-A) 90 ADEBISI V. OKE (1967) NMLR 64
91 (2018) LPELR-44712(CA) Per OREDOLA J.CA 92 (2004) 8 NWLR (PT.874)206 PER KUTIGI J.SC 93 MOBIL PRODUCING (NIG) UNLIMITED V. LASEPA & ORS (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt.789) 1 94 (2008) LPELR-8560(CA) Per PETER-ODILI, J.C.A. (Pp.41-42, Paras.F-A)
95 See KUBOR V DICKSON (Supra) 96 (2018) LPELR-43993 (CA) PER SANKEY J.C.A 97 ADEJUMO V. AYANTEGBE(1989) ALL N.L.R 468 98 (2015) LPELR-24462 (CA) per Tur J.C.A @ pp69-71 99 (2017) 8 NWLR (PT 1567) 167 SC 100 (2012) 11 NWLR (PART 1310) 137 @ 172-173 101 (2012) 17 NWLR (PART 1329) 309 @ 339 102 (2015) ALL FWLR (PT 810) : (2015) LPELR 24447 (SC) 103 (2018) LPELR-43976(CA) 104 P.A.S & T.A. LTD V. BABATUNDE (2008) 8 NWLR (Pt.1089) 267 100 (2012) 11 NWLR (PART 1310) 137 @ 172-173 101 (2012) 17 NWLR (PART 1329) 309 @ 339 102 (2015) ALL FWLR (PT 810) : (2015) LPELR 24447 (SC) 103 (2018) LPELR-43976(CA) 104 P.A.S & T.A. LTD V. BABATUNDE (2008) 8 NWLR (Pt.1089) 267 105 (2014) LPELR-22756(CA) Per IKYEGH, J.C.A (Pp. 36-37, paras. E-D)
